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INTRODUCTION
Pneumoconiosis, commonly known as black lung, is a pro-
gressive and irreversible lung disease that can disable or kill its
victim.' Because the disease frequently afflicts coal miners, Title
IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
(1969 Act)2 established a benefit program intended as "a limited
response in the form of emergency assistance to the miners who
suffer from, and the widows of those who have died with black
lung." 3 The legislation was soon hailed as "the first congres-
sional enactment, in fact, the first law enacted in the United
States which serves exclusively to provide workers' compensation
benefits to the victims of a single occupational disease.
' '4
The black lung benefits program, however, was later de-
scribed as "the classic case of a program that has gotten out of
For a discussion of the medical aspects of pneumoconiosis, see Lapp, A Lawyer's
Medical Guide to Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 721 (1981).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Act] 83 Stat. 792
(Title IV, Black Lung Benefits) [hereinafter Title IV].
H. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmN. NEWS 2503, 2515.
4 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972: FIRsT ANNUAL
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1974 AND rT TRAN-
SITION PERIOD IN r SECOND HALF OF 1973 5 (1975) [hereinafter DOL,.FntST ANNUAL
REPORT].
[VOL. 4:277
1988-89] FEDERAL BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM 279
control." 5 A program originally estimated to cost between $40
million and $355 million 6 rang up a bill of $3 billion by the end
of 1974. 7 The program, which was to have gone out of existence
in 1976, became permanent and claimed billions more; the fed-
eral government and the coal industry paid another $4.4 billion
in benefits between 1975 and 1985.8 The program's large price
tag has had important implications for federal labor law as well
as the federal budget. In fact, one commentator has argued that
the black lung experience will cause "other occupational disease
victims . . . [to] wait many more years before any relief at the
federal level will be forthcoming. '" 9
Why did the black lung benefits program have such a sur-
prisingly high cost? Some commentators have suggested that the
1969 legislation was the source of the problem.10 Others have
suggested that the culprit was the incremental history of the
program's authorizing legislation because the policies embodied
in the 1972,"I 1977,12 and 198113 revisions were in some respects
inconsistent with those embodied in the 1969 Act.'
4
1 Senator John H. Chafee, quoted in 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 115.
6 H. REP. No. 151, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 77, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 237, 290 (Minority Views).
7 Id. at 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 237, 292.
1 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT: ANNUAL REPORT ON AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE ACT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1985 1 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 DOL
REPORT].
9 Solomons, A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black
Lung Interim Presumption and a Survey of Its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REv.
869, 914 (1981).
'o STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93RD CONG., 2D SESS., COMM.
STAFF REPORT ON THE DISABRiTY INSURANCE PROGRAM 8 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
REPORT ON THE DISABnmrrY INSURANCE PROGRAM] (stating the 1969 Act was a "broad
and loosely phrased" piece of legislation, and "prelegislation planning for the imple-
mentation of Black Lung programs was nonexistent," discussing impact on Social
Security Program by diverting essential administrative tasks and staff from their duties.).
,, Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 [hereinafter 1972 Act], Pub. L. No. 92-303,
86 Stat. 150 (1972).
,2 Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 [hereinafter 1977 Revenue Act], Pub.
L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1977) and Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977
[hereinafter 1977 Reform Act], Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1977).
13 Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 [hereinafter 1981 Revenue Amend-
ments], Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981).
14 Note, Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981: Transfer of Special Claims
Under Section 205, 86 W. VA. L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1984).
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This Article examines the legislative history of the federal
black lung benefits program in order to determine why the
program's price tag greatly exceeded original estimates. The
major provisions of each black lung measure and Congress'
reasons for adopting those provisions will be discussed. This
author concludes that the program's cost escalated because of
significant changes in the program. From a substantive stand-
point, these changes were adopted because of a complex com-
bination of factors. From a procedural perspective, most of the
changes can be seen as part of a simple and consistent pattern:
Congress monitored the implementation of the program and
enacted legislation responding to the program's problems,
changes, and developments. In short, Congress learned from
experience.
I. FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969
The 1969 Act was an example of "the great old American
system of waiting for a catastrophe before remedying an evil."' 5
The legislation was prompted by a mine accident at Farmington,
West Virginia that killed seventy-eight miners. 16 Congress found
an "urgent need to provide more effective means and measures
for improving the working conditions and practices in the na-
tion's coal mines in order to prevent death and serious physical
harm.' ' 7 Consequently, the 1969 legislation established dust con-
centration standards" and other mandatory health standards, as
well as air ventilation, 9 electrical equipment grounding, 20 and
other mandatory safety standards. The measure also permitted
11 Address of Judge Harold M. Stephens, Nebraska State Bar Association Meeting
of House of Delegates, 34 Na. L. REV. 339, 412 (1955) (comparing generally legislative
and judicial responses to social problems).
,6 H. REP. No. 563, supra note 3, at 1, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2503. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1969 Act by a
Congressman who actively supported the bill, see Hechler, Enforcement Provisions of
the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Introduction: The Development of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 613 (1975).
17 1969 Act § 2(c), 30 U.S.C. § 801(c) (1970).
1S 1969 Act § 202, 30 U.S.C. § 842 (1970).
19 1969 Act § 303, 30 U.S.C. § 863 (1970).
1969 Act § 307, 30 U.S.C. § 867 (1970).
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each miner to have periodic chest x-rays at no cost to himself,
in order to determine whether he had pneumoconiosis. 2l
A. Title IV - Black Lung Benefits
Congress also found (a) that a number of coal miners were
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine
employment, and (b) that miners who died from the disease were
often survived by dependents. 22 The House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor explained why Title IV of the 1969 Act estab-
lished a federal black lung benefits program:
One of the compelling reasons the committee found it neces-
sary to include this program in the bill was the failure of the
States to assume compensation responsibilities for the miners
covered by the program. State laws are generally remiss in
providing compensation for individuals who suffer from an
occupational disease as it is, and only one State - Pennsyl-
vania - provides retroactive benefits to individuals disabled
by pneumoconiosis.
Also, it is understandable that States which are not coal-
producing have no wish to assume responsibility for residents
who may have contracted the ailment mining in another
State ....
The committee also recognized the problems inherent in re-
quiring employers to assume the cost of compensating indivi-
duals for occupational diseases contracted in years past.
23
The proposed black lung benefits program drew considerable
fire in Congress. 24 Some legislators objected that the program
was a step toward federalization of workers' compensation law,
2
a charge supporters adamantly denied.26 President Nixon ad-
dressed this debate when he signed the legislation, stating that
"in no way should [the black lung benefits program] be consid-
21 1969 Act § 203(a), 30 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1970).
22 1969 Act § 401, 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).
21 H. REP. No. 563, supra note 3, at 13-14, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2503, 2516.
24 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 743.
21 See, e.g., H. REP. No. 563 supra note 3, at 88, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2503, 2573 (Minority Views).
Id. at 23, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2503, 2515.
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ered a precedent for future federal administration of workmen's
compensation programs. "27
Title IV provided for the administration of the program, the
benefits that successful claimants would receive, the conditions
of eligibility, and the rules for establishing entitlement.
1. Program Administration
Title IV consisted of three parts, A, B, and C. Parts B and
C provided for two separate benefits programs. 28 This two-part
structure was a compromise allocating the cost of the program.
"What the compromise really amounted to was that the federal
government would pick up the lifetime cost of the huge backlog
of claims that had accumulated over decades, while the industry
would pick up the burden of paying the claims of those still
working." ' 29 In addition, the compromise was intended to give
the states an incentive to enact improved workers' compensation
laws.30
Part B, "Claims for Benefits Filed on or Before December
31, 1972," was administered by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW), probably because of that De-
partment's experience in administering old age, disability, and
other benefit programs.3 1 The statute provided that HEW was
to administer the program (to the greatest extent possible) using
the procedures used for determining entitlement to disability
27 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 735.
Randolph & Hurmphreys, Black Lung Benefits Reform: Mirage or Reality?, 28
LABOR L.J. 555, 556 (1977). BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG, FEDERAL COMPEN-
SATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1987) 33. Part A contains definitions, a statement
of findings and declarations.
29 S. REP. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess., 48, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADim. NEws 2305, 2336 (views of Sen. Javits and Sen. Taft).
10 Id. at 7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2305, 2311. Part
B was effective immediately, whereas Part C did not take effect for three years in order
to give the states time to enact workers' compensation laws meeting federal criteria.
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., Background Information for Hearings on the Insolvency Problems of the Black
Lung Disability Trust Fund 2 (Comm. Print July 27, 1981) [hereinafter Background
Information for Hearings].
"1 Solomons, supra note 9, at 869-70.
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insurance benefits under the Social Security Act.12 The Depart-
ment consequently delegated responsibility for implementing the
program to the Social Security Administration (SSA). 3 SSA was
responsible for processing miner's claims filed on or before
December 31, 1972, 34 and widow's claims filed by the later of
December 31, 1972, or six months after the death of the miner.
35
Claims filed on or after January 1, 1973, were governed by
Part C of Title IV, "Claims for Benefits After December 31,
1972." Congress expected that Part C benefits would be paid
by the industry and the states through workers' compensation
statutes; the federal government would provide a safety net to
ensure that all miners were covered by an adequate compensation
scheme. Federal responsibility for administering Title IV was
placed in the Department of Labor (DOL), most likely because
"the Department of Labor has had half a century of experience
in the workers' compensation area . ",36
Part C claims were to be filed under the applicable state
worker's compensation law, 37 if the Secretary of Labor approved
that law.3" Persons not covered by an approved state law could
32 1969 Act § 413(b), 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1970). The processing of Part B claims
began with an administrative determination of eligibility. If the claim was denied, the
claimant could request a reconsideration. If he was dissatisfied with that decision, the
claimant could take his claim to an administrative law judge, to the Appeals Council,
and then to the federal district courts. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON PART B OF TITLE IV OF THE FEDERAL MINE HEALTH
AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969, HOUSE CoMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 13 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter HEW, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT]. Part B proceedings were nonadver-
sarial. Lopatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. VA. L. REv.
677, 687 (1983).
11 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT ON
PART B OF TITLE IV OF THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969,
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR 13 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter HEW,
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT].
3' 1969 Act § 414(a), 30 U.S.C. § 923(a) (1970).
" Id. The miner, however, had to have died on or before January 1, 1973. See
infra note 48 and accompanying text.
36 DOL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
1' 1969 Act § 421(a), 30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1970).
11 The 1969 Act set forth several criteria that state laws had to meet to be approved,
including the payment of benefits for a miner's total disability or death due to pneu-
moconiosis, the payment of benefits substantially equivalent to or greater than those
paid under Title IV, and the use of substantially equivalent standards for establishing
death or disability due to pneumoconiosis. 1969 Act § 421(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(2)
(1970).
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file a Part C claim with DOL, which would process the claim
following the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act.3 9
Part C benefits would be paid by coal mine operators.4 If
no coal mine operator could be identified as responsible for
benefits in a particular case, the federal government would foot
the bill.4 ' In addition, if a responsible operator failed to pay
benefits within a reasonable period, the federal government would
pay the benefits and seek recovery from the operator.
4 2
The Part C program, like the Part B program, was to be
temporary, 43 lasting only until December 30, 1976. 44 "The prem-
ise was that State workers' compensation programs would pro-
vide adequate coverage by that time." ' 45 Congress also believed
that the coal dust standards established in Title II of the 1969
Act would eliminate black lung disease among coal miners.
6
2. Eligibility
Part B and Part C only provided benefits to miners and
their widows. More specifically, benefits were available to two
19 1969 Act § 422(a), 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1970). Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act [hereinafter Longshoremen's Act], Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44
Stat. 1424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982)). A Part C claim was initially reviewed
by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Division of Coal Mine Workers'
Compensation. If a claimant was dissatisfied with the decision at the administrative
level, he could take the case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges, then to the
Benefits Review Board, and finally to a federal court of appeals. Lopatto, supra note
32, at 688; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972: SECOND ANNUMAL
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1975 8 (1976) [here-
inafter DOL, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT]. For a discussion of adjudication procedures
under the Part C program, see Bober & Gunderson, A Judge's Perspective on the
Presentation of Evidence at a Black Lung Hearing, 50 TENN. L. REv. 491 (1983); Smith
& Newman, The Basics of Federal Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 763 (1983).
, 1969 Act § 422(b), 30 U.S.C. § 932(b) (1970).
1969 Act § 424, 30 U.S.C. § 934 (1970).
42 Id.
,1 Political reasons probably influenced the decision to make both the Part B and
Part C programs temporary. President Nixon, in signing the 1969 Act, stressed that
Title IV was "temporary, limited and unique." 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 735. The
president might have vetoed the 1969 Act if it had created a permanent black lung
benefits program.
- 1969 Act § 422(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 932(e)(3) (1970).
41 Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 3.
- H. REP. No. 563, supra note 3, at 14, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 2503, 2516.
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classes: (1) underground coal miners totally disabled by pneu-
moconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, 47 and (2) wid-
ows of underground coal miners, if the miner died from
pneumoconiosis before January 1, 1973, or was receiving federal
black lung benefits at the time of his death.
4 8
3. Benefits
The amount of black lung benefits paid to a successful
claimant varied with the size of his family. A recipient with no
dependents received fifty percent of the amount paid to a totally
disabled GS-2 level federal employee. 49 Benefits increased by fifty
percent if the recipient supported a spouse or child, by seventy-
five percent if the recipient had two dependents, and by one
hundred percent if the recipient had three or more dependents.50
The benefit provisions in Part B and Part C differed signif-
icantly. Under Part B, a successful claimant could receive ben-
efits for periods of eligibility commencing with the date the
claim was filed or the date he filed the claim or the date he
became eligible." Claimants filing for benefits by December 31,
1971, could receive lifetime benefits paid by the federal govern-
ment.12 For Part B claims filed after December 31, 1971, no
benefits were to be paid under Part B for any period of eligibility
after December 31, 1972.11 In contrast, a successful Part C
47 1969 Act § 411(a), 30 U.S.C. § 921(a) (1970).
41 1969 Act § 414(e), 30 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1970).
49 1969 Act § 412(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1970). One obvious reason for the
increased cost of the black lung benefits program was an increase in benefit rates -
which occurred without a change in the program's authorizing legislation. In 1969, a
successful claimant without dependants received approximately $136 per month. H. REP.
No. 563, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2503,
2514. Such a claimant received $328.20 per month in 1985. 1985 DOL REPORT supra
note 8 at 27.
The total amount paid to any one successful claimant could be considerable. The Labor
Department estimated that the benefits paid to a living minor and survivor over the
period from 1979 to 1999 would total almost $174,000. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK
LUNG BENEFITS ACT: ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT FOR CALENDAR
YEAR 1979, 32 (Table 12) (1979) [hereinafter 1979 DOL REPORT].
- 1969 Act § 412(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (1970).
" See 1969 Act § 414(c), 30 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970); BARTH, supra note 28, at 206-
07.
52 1969 Act § 414(c), 30 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1970).
,3 1969 Act § 414(b), 30 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1970).
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claimant (who could also receive benefits commencing with the
date of filing or the date on which he became eligible) 4 was not
to be paid for any period of eligibility prior to January 1, 1973,
nor for any period of eligibility after December 30, 1976."1
Part B benefits were to be reduced by an amount equal to
any payment received on account of the miner's disability under
state workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, or
disability insurance laws, and by the amount of excess earnings
under the Social Security Act.56 Part C benefits were to be
reduced by the amount of any payment received under federal
or state workers' compensation laws on account of death or
disability due to pneumoconiosis.1
7
4. Establishing Entitlement
For a claimant to be entitled to benefits, he had to establish
that "(1) the miner [was] totally disabled, (2) the total disability
[was] due to pneumoconiosis, (3) the pneumoconiosis arose out
of employment in the Nation's coal mines, or that (4) the miner's
death was due to pneumoconiosis."s
Congress realized, however, that proving entitlement would
be difficult. How does one prove that he is totally disabled?
That the disability is caused by pneumoconiosis? And that the
pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment? Moreover,
considering that the program would start with a large backlog
of claims, how could these issues be resolved expeditiously?
Congress answered these questions by delegating authority
to HEW to promulgate regulations for establishing total disa-
bility or death due to pneumoconiosis. 9 Significantly, Congress
gave HEW authority to promulgate such regulations for both
14 Under Part C, benefits are based on the date the claim was filed or
the date of death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis, whichever is
earlier. . . . If the Labor Department is unable to establish a date at which
total disability began, the date the claim was filed is used.
BARTH, supra note 28, at 207.
" 1969 Act § 422(e), 30 U.S.C. § 932(e) (1970).
56 1969 Act § 412(b), 30 U.S.C. § 922(b) (1970).
' 1969 Act § 422(g), 30 U.S.C. § 932(g) (1970).
58 Smith & Newman, supra note 39, at 765.
" 1969 Act § 411(b), 30 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970).
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the Part B and Part C programs. 60 The 1969 Act mandated that
these regulations provide three presumptions: (1) an irrebuttable
presumption of total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis
where the miner had complicated pneumoconiosis, (2) a rebutt-
able presumption that pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine
employment where a miner spent ten or more years in under-
ground coal mines and had simple pneumoconiosis, and (3) a
rebuttable presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis where
a deceased miner spent ten years or more in underground coal
mines and died from a respirable disease.
61
These presumptions were "the product of both factual un-
derstandings and policy concerns. '62 Factual understandings in-
cluded the nature of black lung as a progressive and irreversible
disease. 63 For example, if a person had complicated pneumo-
coniosis,64 Congress believed he was likely to be totally disabled
and unlikely to improve. 65 Policy concerns included a desire for
expeditious case processing6 as well as a desire to aid claimants
in establishing entitlement.
67
B. Impetus for Change
The black lung program was undoubtedly well received in
the coal regions in 1969. The reception cooled, however, as
miners and their widows became confused. Claimants were con-
fused by program requirements and decision results.6 "[Miany
claimants continue to have the strong view that the program is
60 1969 Act § 422(h), 30 U.S.C. § 932(h) (1970).
61 1969 Act § 411(c), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1970).
62 Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 108 S. Ct. 427, 439 (1987).
63 Cf., DOL, FnsT ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that the black
lung legislation "contains a number of provisions especially designed to fit the latent,
progressive and unusual character" of pneumoconiosis).
" "In simple pneumoconiosis the ability of the lung to transfer oxygen to the
blood is reduced. Complicated pneumoconiosis involves massive scarring and degenera-
tion of lung tissue. In the complicated stage the disease severely limits physical capacities
and can be fatal." Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 1.
63 H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD MN. NEws 237, 239.
Query, The Black Lung Benefits Act: An Operator's Perspective, 83 W. VA. L.
REv. 855, 856 (1981).
67 Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 3.
" HEW, FIRsT ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 18.
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designed to provide supplementary benefits to underground coal
miners solely on the basis of long-term mine work or, if simple
pneumoconiosis is present, irrespective of the requirement of
total disability due to the disease." 69 The presumptions height-
ened claimants' confusion; HEW noted that miners were con-
fused because some totally disabled persons were denied benefits
because they were not disabled by pneumoconiosis, whereas
others were awarded benefits because of the presence of com-
plicated pneumoconiosis - even though they were not totally
disabled .70
Confusion can quickly lead to dissatisfaction, and both the
miners and their elected representatives quickly began to show
dissatisfaction with the program. Indeed, Congress began con-
sidering substantial revisions in the program only two years after
Title IV became law.
71
II. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT OF 1972
Congress in 1969 inadvertently failed to provide benefits to
so-called "double orphans," a miner's surviving children where
the miner's spouse had also passed away. 72 Legislation was quickly
introduced to correct the oversight. 73 From these humble origins
grew the 1972 Act, 74 which virtually rewrote Title IV.
Congress had several reasons for revising the black lung
benefits program. Congress was dissatisfied "with the adminis-
61 Id. at 21. Claimant misunderstanding would continue to plague the program
during the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 73-74 (Minority
Views) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 237, 286 (recounting a
witness' testimony complaining that a claimant disabled in a mining accident had been
denied black lung benefits). Unfortunately, claimants were not the only ones who
misunderstood the program. See, e.g., Investigation of the Backlog in Black Lung Cases:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986) 20 [hereinafter Investigation of the Backlog
Hearings] (testimony from a United Mine Worker official suggesting that miners were
entitled to benefits because of the horrible working conditions they endured). A clai-
mant's attorney suggested that the program compensated miners for decreased earning
power due to black lung. Id. at 42.
70 HEW FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 20.
" See 1971 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 566.
" BARTH, supra note 28, at 39.
73 Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 4.
" Pub. L. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153 (1972) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-41 (1976)).
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tration of the law by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (Social Security Administration) which, in some re-
spects, clearly contravened discernible legislative guidelines."
'7
In addition, Congress was surprised at the large number of
claims filed and the small number of claims approved under
Title IV. Congress in 1969 believed that about 100,000 persons
had pneumoconiosis and about 50,000 persons were disabled by
the disease. 76 The number of black lung claims filed was much
higher than anticipated based on those figures: 18,000 claims
were filed in the first week of the program, 100,000 claims were
filed during its first month, 77 and filings continued at a higher-
than-expected rate. 7 "As of the passage of the [1972] amend-
ments, some 365,000 claims had been filed under the old law,
with [initial] decisions made in 345,000 cases (of which about
171,000 claims were allowed, and 174,000 denied) and 20,000
were pending."
'79
These numbers "suggest[ed] strongly that the solution has
not been nearly as complete as Congress believed and expected
it would be." 80 Congress therefore revised the legislation to
"more adequately meet the objectives originally sought in Title
IV,""s with the result that program costs increased substantially.
In fact, the 1972 Act's estimated $4 billion price tag82 put the
" H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 237, 240.
76 See H. REP. No. 563, supra note 3, at 17-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2503, 2520; Randolph & Humphreys, supra note 28, at 557;
Stephens & Hollon, Closing the Evidentiary Gap: A Review of Circuit Court Opinions
Analyzing Federal Black Lung Presumptions of Entitlement, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 793
(1981).
7 HEW, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 15.
78 Id. The number of claims filed under the 1981 Act was also higher than expected.
REPORT TO THE HONORABLE DONALD J. PEASE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BY THE
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADJUDICATION OF BLACK LUNG CLAIMS
BY LABOR'S OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND BENEFITS REviEw BOARD 11
[hereinafter 1984 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL] reprinted in Delays in Proc-
essing and Adjudicating Black Lung Claims, Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 37, 55 (1985) [hereinafter
Delays in Processing Hearing].
79 HEW, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 1.
w S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2305, 2307.
11 Id. at 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMwi. NEws 2305.
82 1972 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 185.
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measure in jeopardy of a presidential veto,83 just as the estimated
cost of Title IV had placed the 1969 Act in jeopardy of veto.
4
Political considerations,85 however, gave Congress considerable
leverage in 1972 because the bill went to the White House during
the presidential election campaign. President Nixon signed the
measure partly out of concern about the potential electoral con-
sequences of a veto.
6
A. Expanding the Program
1. Program Administration
Considering the political disincentives to ending a benefit
program - particularly one with a sizable client group concen-
trated in a few states - one should not be surprised that
Congress in 1972 prolonged the life of the black lung benefits
program. The Part C program was extended for an additional
five years, through December 30, 1981 .87 Part B was extended
so that the federal government would pay lifetime benefits to
persons filing claims on or before June 30, 1973.88
Extending the filing period for lifetime benefits under the
Part B program meant that Congress also had to change the
transition-year Part B program. The 1969 Act had provided that
a claimant filing for benefits between January 1 and December
31, 1972, could receive Part B benefits for periods of eligibility
until December 31, 1972.89 To receive benefits after that date,
such a claimant would need to file a new application under
83 Id.
, 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 79; Hechler, supra note 16, at 616.
The political leadership in Washington undoubtedly influenced the substance of
the black lung legislation enacted during the period from 1969 to 1981. Changes in
presidential administrations had important consequences for black lung legislation. See
infra note 133 and accompanying text. In addition, legislators from coal mining states
held important positions during much of this period. For example, in 1972 Hugh Scott
of Pennsylvania was minority leader in the Senate, Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia
was majority whip in the Senate, and Carl D. Perkins of Kentucky was Chairman of
the House Committee on Education and Labor.
86 1972 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 185.
1972 Act § 5(4), 30 U.S.C. § 932(e) (1976).
1972 Act § 5(2), (3), 30 U.S.C. § 924(b),(e) (1976).
" See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 4:277
1988-89] FEDERAL BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM
either the applicable state workers' compensation law or the Part
C program. 90 Under the 1972 Act, a claimant filing between July
1, and December 31, 1973, could receive no benefits under Part
B after December 31, 1973. 91 Such a claimant, however, would
not need to refile under Part C because applications filed during
the transition period were to be filed with HEW but processed
and, if appropriate, paid by DOL.
92
Congress' decision to prolong the life of the program obvi-
ously increased the program's cost by increasing the amount of
benefits paid. The 1972 Act also increased the program's admin-
istrative expenses because the measure imposed additional ad-
ministrative responsibilities on HEW. Congress in 1969 expected
that research would be conducted to devise new methods of
diagnosing and treating pneumoconiosis. Instead, SSA largely
relied on x-ray evidence. 93 The 1972 Act responded to this de-
velopment by requiring HEW to conduct medical research through
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and
by authorizing HEW to award grants for such research. 94
In addition, the 1972 Act included administrative provisions
intended to increase the availability of medical facilities with the
resources to diagnose and treat black lung. Establishing eligibility
usually required medical tests such as x-rays, pulmonary function
studies, or blood gas studies. Many coal mining regions lacked
medical facilities with the equipment necessary to perform these
tests, or lacked facilities with the capacity to handle the large
number of persons who desired testing. 95 To aid claimants in
o S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 26, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2305, 2329-30.
"1 1972 Act § 5(1), 30 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1976).
92 1972 Act § 7, 30 U.S.C. § 925 (1976). In point of fact, this arrangement was
continued by agreement between the two agencies until September 1, 1974. DOL, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
¢1 S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 10, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2305, 2314.
1, 1972 Act § 5(6), 30 U.S.C. § 937(b) (1976).
95 Solomons, supra note 9, at 877. The lack of adequate medical facilities caused
a delay in processing some Part B claims early in the black lung program. REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AcItEVEMENTS,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS, AND COSTS IN PAYING BLACK LUNG BENEFITS TO COAL MINERS
AND THEIR Wmows 16 (September 5, 1972) [hereinafter 1972 REPORT OF THE COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL].
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garnering the evidence necessary to establish entitlement, Con-
gress authorized HEW to award grants or enter into contracts
"for the construction, purchase, and operation of fixed-site and
mobile clinical facilities for the analysis, examination, and treat-




The 1969 Act limited eligibility to miners who worked in
underground coal mines and certain widows of such miners. In
1972, Congress decided that pneumoconiosis afflicted enough
surface miners to warrant extending aid to persons working in
above-ground mines .
97
The 1972 Act also extended benefits to persons who were
considered deserving of aid although not themselves suffering
from pneumoconiosis. 98 The 1969 Act permitted widows to re-
ceive benefits only if the miner had died from pneumoconiosis
or was receiving benefits at the time of his death.99 The 1972
Act also permitted widows to receive benefits if the miner was
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time of death.'00
Moreover, the 1972 Act extended eligibility for survivors'
benefits to additional classes of persons. Under the 1969 Act,
only widows (or widowers) were eligible for survivors' benefits.
The 1972 Act extended survivors' benefits to (a) double or-
phans; 0 1 (b) dependent parents, where the deceased miner was
not survived by a spouse or child; 02 and (c) dependent siblings,
where the deceased miner was not survived by a spouse, child,
or parent. 03
The changes in eligibility had a considerable impact on the
cost of the black lung benefits program. Their impact was mag-
1972 Act § 5(6), 30 U.S.C. § 937(a) (1976).
' 1972 Act § 3(b), 30 U.S.C. § 902(d) (1976) ("coal mine" substituted for "un-
derground coal mine").
" 1972 Act § I(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 922 (1976).
- See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
1' 1972 Act § 4(b), 30 U.S.C. § 921 (1976).
10, 1972 Act § 1(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) (1976).
10 1972 Act § 1(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5) (1976).
103 Id.
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nified by Congress' decision to make most of the changes ret-
roactive. For example, the 1972 Act provided that orphans'0
4
and surface miners'05 could recover benefits for any period of
eligibility covered by the 1969 Act. A surface miner filing for
benefits in 1973 could thus receive benefits for any period of
eligibility commencing after December 30, 1969.
3. Benefits
Under the 1969 Act, SSA treated black lung benefits as
workers' compensation payments
subject to offsetting, or reduction, where a claimant also re-
ceives social security disability payments. Section 224 of the
Social Security Act requires that if the combination of social
security disability benefits and workmen's compensation ben-
efits exceeds 80 percent of 'average current earnings' . . . such
social security disability payments are to be reduced by the
excess amount. 1°6
The 1972 Act prohibited the practice of offsetting disability
insurance payments by stating that, effective December 30, 1969,




Experience under the 1969 Act demonstrated that medical
science had a lot to learn about pneumoconiosis. As a result,
the Part B program was embroiled in controversy over how to
determine the presence of black lung, the extent of disability,
and the cause of disability or death. 08 Congress recognized the
problem, and provided the following guidance to the Executive
Branch:
10, See 1972 Act § 1(cX6), 30 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (3) (1976).
101 1972 Act § 3(a), (b), 30 U.S.C. §§ 901, 902, 921, 932, 933 (1976)).
1 S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 21, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2305, 2325.
101 1972 Act § 2, 30 U.S.C. § 922(b) (1976).
1o8 1972 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 95, at 22.
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The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 is intended to be a
remedial law - to improve upon the 1969 provisions so that
the cases which should be compensated, will be compensated.
In the absence of definitive medical conclusions there is a clear
need to resolve doubts in favor of the disabled miner or his
survivors. 109
Congress gave more concrete resolutions to several other
disputes over how to establish entitlement. One such dispute was
over the appropriate test for determining total disability. The
test provided in the Social Security Act was "inability to engage
in substantial gainful activity," so SSA denied benefits if the
claimant was still employed." 0 Congress found that test
unrealistic when applied to coal miners, if it results in the
denial of claims of miners who for medical reasons can no
longer be expected to work in the mines and for whom there
is no, too often, other realistic employment opportunity, or
for whom the only opportunity for employment may be at
wages far less then the [sic] would have earned had they been
able to continue to work in their usual jobs."'
The 1972 Act consequently required SSA to consider the facts
of each individual case, and to find a claimant "totally disabled
when pneumoconiosis prevents [the miner] from engaging in
gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable
to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which he
previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial
period of time.""' 2
Congress also intervened in the dispute over whether a neg-
ative x-ray indicated the absence of pneumoconiosis. Chest x-
rays had once been considered a sine qua non for establishing
the presence of totally disabling pneumoconiosis," 3 but by 1972
109 S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADhIN. NEWS 2305, 2315.
11 Lopatto, supra note 32, at 685.
" S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 16-17 reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIe. NEws 2305, 2320-21.
112 1972 Act § 4(a), 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1976).
'" HEW, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 18; S. REP. No. 743, supra
note 33, at 18, S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADhIN. NEWS 2305, 2315.
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x-rays were seen as a diagnostic tool of limited reliability." 4
Congress concluded that a negative x-ray was not a reliable
indication of the absence of pneumoconiosis. Consequently, the
1972 Act provided that no claim was to be denied solely on the
basis of a negative chest x-ray." 5 The 1972 Act also provided
that a miner with at least fifteen years of underground coal mine
employment, who had evidence of a totally disabling respiratory
or pulmonary impairment but who also had a negative chest x-
ray, would be presumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconi-
osis, to have died from pneumoconiosis, or to have been totally
disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time of death." 6 This pre-
sumption could be rebutted by evidence that the miner did not
have pneumoconiosis or that his respiratory or pulmonary im-
pairment did not arise out of coal mine employment."
7
Some of the changed rules on establishing entitlement, like
some of the changed rules on eligibility, were retroactive. For
example, the provision prohibiting the denial of a claim solely
on the basis of a negative x-ray was made retroactive to Decem-
ber 30, 1969.118 Making the new rules retroactive meant that
many previously denied claims might now be granted. Congress
therefore required HEW to reconsider every claim denied or
pending under the 1969 Act to determine whether the claimant
was eligible under the new standards established in the 1972
Act." 9 Review was to be automatic; the claimant would not need
to refile his claim or otherwise request review. 20
B. Requiem for Part B, Baptism of Part C
The Part B statistics are somewhat surprising, given the
limited response envisioned in 1969:
By December 31, 1974, the termination point for Part B, SSA
had received and processed about 556,200 separate black lung
"" See, e.g., 1972 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 95, at 42-48.
"1 1972 Act § 4(f), 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1976).
,,6 1972 Act § 4(c), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1976).
17 Id.
1972 Act § 4(f), (g), 30 U.S.C. §§ 922 note, 923(b) (1976).
"' See 1972 Act § 6, 30 U.S.C. § 941 (1976).
Id. See also, S. REP. No. 743, supra note 29, at 25, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2305, 2329.
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claims. Of these, approximately 400,000 were approved for
benefits. Benefit augmentation for survivors and dependents
of each miner or deceased miner resulted in nearly 510,000
individuals receiving compensation on these claims. Part B was
costing about 860 million dollars a year by 1974, paid from
general appropriations.' 2'
Many successful Part B claimants received benefits because
of the changes wrought by the 1972 Act. According to a report
by the staff of the House Ways and Means Committee, 191,600
claims denied under the 1969 Act had been reopened by 1974
and more than 110,000 of those claims had been allowed under
the 1972 Act. 122 Congress had clearly stated it wanted more
claims approved, and SSA responded.
2
1
The Part C program, of course, had not yet taken effect
when the 1972 Act was passed. The impact of the 1972 Act on
the Part C program is therefore difficult to determine. The
legislation, however, might have had important psychological
consequences for parties interested in the Part C program. If
the 1972 Act indicated that Congress intended to monitor the
development of the program closely, claimants and program
administrators might have expected that Congress would enact
additional black lung legislation a few years after Part C took
effect. Persons holding such an expectation would not have been
disappointed.
III. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVENUE ACT OF 1977 AND
BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REFORM ACT OF 1977
Congress enacted two significant pieces of black lung legis-
lation in 1977 to address two fundamentally different concerns.
The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977 (1977 Revenue
121 Lopatto, supra note 32, at 686 (footnotes omitted).
'2 REPORT ON THE DiSAInTy INSURANCE PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 416.
' One commentator has argued that the Part B program, after the 1972 Act,
constituted a stacked deck: "The remedial nature of the statute, combined with the fact
that claims under Part B were for federally-funded benefits and not a claim for benefits
against a private party with its own interests and finances to protect created an atmos-
phere strongly favoring the approval of an award of benefits." Query, supra note 66,
at 858.
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Act)124 addressed concerns over the surprisingly high cost of the
Part C program. Under the 1969 and 1972 Acts, the federal
government used money from the general fund of the Treasury
to fund its Part C obligations, 125 which were beginning to add
up to a sizable sum. The 1977 Revenue Act created a trust fund
to achieve a goal set in 1969: making the coal industry bear the
cost of the black lung benefits program.
126
The 1977 Revenue Act was accompanied by the Black Lung
Benefits Reform Act of 1977 (1977 Reform Act). 27 "The pri-
mary purpose of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977
... [was] to remove certain eligibility restrictions from the ex-
isting federal black lung benefits program."'' 28 The measure's
supporters argued that such revisions were necessary because
DOL had approved less than ten percent of the claims filed
under Part C.129 Its detractors, meanwhile, argued that "all
124 Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978) [hereinafter 1977 Revenue Act].
,2 Explanatory statement of Russell B. Long (Chairman, Senate Committee on
Finance) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADWmN. NEws 72, 74.
'16 Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 7.
127 Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978) [hereinafter 1977 Reform Act].
In Note, Evidentiary Requirements to Prove a Claim for Black Lung Benefits:
Impact of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425
(1980).
I" Id. at 1425-26. The regulations governing the Part B and Part C programs
explain much of the difference in the approval rates of the two programs. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, BLACK LUNG ]BENEFITS ACT: ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE
ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1976 4-5 (1977) [hereinafter 1976 DOL REPORT].
SSA promulgated regulations implementing Part B. 20 C.F.R. § 410 (1971). After
Congress passed the 1972 Act, SSA revised those regulations to include interim rules for
adjudicating (a) claims filed by a miner prior to July 1, 1973 and (b) claims filed by a
survivor where the miner died before January 1, 1974. 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 (1973).
Those regulations were so lenient that one commentator described them as turning the
program into a "de facto federal pension program" and a "conduit for an enormous
amount of congressional largesse." Solomons, supra note 9, at 915. See also, REPORT
OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, EXAMINATION OF ALLEGATIONS
CONCERNING ADMINISTRATION OF THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM 6-10 (January 14,
1976). The regulations promulgated by SSA for determining disability under Part C were
much stricter. Lopatto, supra note 32, at 691; Solomons, supra note 9, at 873.
Congress was displeased with SSA's decision to impose tighter eligibility require-
ments on the Part C program, so the 1977 Reform Act authorized DOL to promulgate
regulations establishing criteria for determining the presence of a total disability. DOL's
regulations, however, could be no more restrictive than those applicable to claims filed
on June 30, 1973 (the last day a claimant could apply for lifetime benefits under the
Part B program). 1977 Reform Act § 2(c), 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). DOL
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present available medical evidence shows that the SSA and the
DOL have already erred on the basis of being too liberal."' 130
In 1976, the House of Representatives passed legislation to
reduce eligibility requirements under Part C.'3 1 The Senate took
no action on the bill.3 2 The political calculus changed substan-
tially in 1977 because the Ford Administration, which opposed
the 1976 proposal on fiscal grounds, 3  was replaced by the
Carter Administration. Black lung legislation was introduced
early in 1977, but not enacted until 1978.
A. 1977 Revenue Act
Congress did not expect that federal liability for benefits
under the Part C program would be significant. The legislature
expected that the states would administer the program under
workers' compensation statutes and that benefits under the fed-
eral program would generally be paid by coal mine operators. 134
The House Committee on Education and Labor observed that:
Two significant realities have acted to frustrate the objective
of transferring claims liability from the Federal Treasury to
subsequently promulgated interim regulations implementing Part C. 20 C.F.R. § 727
(1979). See also Claims for Black Lung Benefits Payable under Part C of Title IV of
the Federal Coal and Mine Health and Safety Act, as Amended, 20 C.F.R. part 725
(1974). DOL later promulgated permanent implementing regulations. Standards for
Determining Coal Miners' Total Disability or Death Due to Pneumoconiosis, 30 C.F.R.
part 718 (1980).
Late in 1988, a sharply divided Supreme Court held that the DOL interim regula-
tions violated the 1977 Reform Act's proscription against the promulgation of regulations
more restrictive than those applied prior to June 30, 1973. Pittston Coal Company v.
Sebben, 109 S.Ct. 414 (1988). The Court's decision could have had an enormous impact
on the cost of the program because one of the cases under review raised the issue of
whether mandamus would lie against the Secretary to compel the readjudication of
finally determined cases decided under the interim regulations. The Court refused to
issue the writ, stating that black lung claimants who accepted an incorrect adjudication
rather than appealing the decision "are in no different position from any claimant who
seeks to avoid the bar of res judicata on the ground that the decision was wrong." Id.
at 424.
30 H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 83 (Minority Views), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 237, 295.
"I Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 7.
132 Id.
," 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 375.
' See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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States and coal operators: (1) No State workmen's compensa-
tion law has yet been deemed "adequate" under Part C, and
(2) the Department of Labor has been successful in identifying
responsible operators only with respect to about 25 or 30
percent of the Part C claims. Moreover, recent testimony
before the Subcommittee indicated that 97 percent of putative
responsible operator cases are being contested by the industry.
The confluence of these unanticipated occurrences has meant
continued federal liability for black lung claims filed after the
period when such liability was expected to end.'3 5
To relieve the pressure Part C put on the general fund, the
1977 Revenue Act created the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund
(Trust Fund) 3 6 to make the black lung disability program self-
sustaining. The Trust Fund, which was managed by the Secretary
of the Treasury (as managing trustee) and the Secretaries of
Labor and Health, Education and Welfare, 3 7 was financed by a
tax on coal (except lignite) sold by the producer after March 31,
1978.138 The tax rate was fifty cents per ton for coal produced
from underground mines and twenty-five cents per ton for coal
produced from surface mines, with the tax capped at two percent
of the coal's selling price. 3 9 The Trust Fund could also receive
advances from the Treasury,140 amounts recovered from an op-
3 H. REp. No. 151, supra note 6, at 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 237, 257. Coal mine operators' early determination to test the constitu-
tionality of the 1969 Act yielded considerable litigation. DOL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 4, at 1. The United States Supreme Court found the 1969 Act constitutional
in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). The Department of Labor
expected the number of contested cases to decline after that decision, but coal mine
operators continued to contest a large number of claims. 1976 DOL REPORT, supra note
129, at 15.
136 Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 1283 (1978), 30 U.S.C. § 9 34(aX) (Supp. IV 1980)
[hereinafter Trust Fund].
, 1977 Revenue Act § 3(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 934(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
" 1977 Revenue Act § 2(d), 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (Supp. IV 1980).
,39 1977 Revenue Act § 2, 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (Supp. IV 1980). The two-tiered tax
structure was a compromise between House members who wanted a flat rate tax on
each ton of coal (arguing that those producing the most coal should pay the most tax)
and Senators who wanted a tax based on a percentage of the coal's price (arguing that
surface-mined coal not only sold at lower prices but was also less likely to cause black
lung in miners). Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 10.
1, 1977 Revenue Act § 3(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 934a(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Such
advances were to be repaid with interest at a rate based on the interest rate of marketable
United States Government obligations. Id.
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erator where the Trust Fund had paid benefits for which the
operator was responsible,1 41 and fines and penalties.1 42
Trust Fund monies were used to pay benefits in certain
situations:
Generally, the fund is required to pay benefits with respect to
claims in which the miner's last coal mine employment was
before January 1, 1970, provided the claim is filed after June
30, 1973. Also, the fund pays benefits if there is no coal mine
operator among the miner's employers who is responsible for
paying such benefits ... or if the responsible operator is in
default. 
143
To protect the Trust Fund, the 1977 Reform Act made the
Secretary of Labor a party in all cases in which the Trust Fund
would be liable if the claimant was awarded benefits.44
Trust Fund monies were also used to pay the expenses of
administering the Trust Fund and of collecting the coal tax, as
well as the administrative expenses of DOL under Part C after
the effective date of the 1977 Reform Act (March 1, 1978).
14
Congress effectively made many of the expenditure provi-
sions of the 1977 Revenue Act retroactive. Among other things,
the Trust Fund was to repay the Treasury for all amounts
expended by DOL for benefits paid to Part C claimants prior
to April 1, 1978 (except for amounts paid on account of periods
of eligibility commencing before January 1, 1974).' 46
B. 1977 Reform Act
The 1977 Reform Act was "remedial in nature - in several
instances again redefining misapprehended legislative intent.' 1 47
Congress again virtually rewrote Title IV, expanding eligibility
and easing the rules on establishing entitlement. Although pro-
41 1977 Revenue Act § 3(b)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 934a(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
42 1977 Revenue Act § 3(b)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 934a(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
, H. REP. No. 406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIq. NEWS 2671-72.
1977 Reform Act § 7(k), 30 U.S.C. § 932(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
'' 1977 Revenue Act § 3(d), 30 U.S.C. § 934(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
'" 1977 Revenue Act § 3(d), 30 U.S.C. § 934(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
" H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ArDiN. NEws 237, 240.
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gram supporters were not able to expand the program as much
as they would have liked,' 48 some commentators have argued
that the 1977 Reform Act, combined with the 1972 Act, trans-
formed the black lung program from a benefits program to a
"full-fledged workers' compensation program."' 49 Not surpris-
ingly, the 1977 expansion had a substantial impact on the pro-
gram's cost.
1. Program Administration
The 1977 Reform Act's administrative provisions were like
those in the 1972 Act in several respects. For example, the 1977
Reform Act required the Executive Branch to conduct research.
DOL was to
conduct a study of all occupationally related pulmonary and
respiratory diseases, including the extent and severity of such
diseases in the United States. Such study shall further include
analyses of (1) any etiologic, symptomatologic, and pathologic
factors which are similar to such factors in coal workers'
pneumoconiosis and its sequelae; (2) the adequacy of current
workers' compensation programs in compensating individuals
with such diseases; and (3) the status and adequacy of Federal
,41 For example, the bill as proposed in 1977 provided that a claimant who spent
30 years working in an underground bituminous coal mine (or 25 years working in an
underground anthracite coal mine) would be eligible for benefits without proof of black
lung if his last coal mine employment ended before June 30, 1971. Background Infor-
mation for Hearings, supra note 30, at 8.
The bill as originally proposed also would have provided black lung benefits to
eligible survivors of a miner who was killed in a mine accident if the miner had at least
17 years of underground coal mine employment. H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 25,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 237, 261. Provisions such as these
led a minority of House Committee members to state:
this bill violates the assurances of its original sponsors that the black lung
program was intended to be a 'one-shot' special type compensation plan....
[t]he fact that there has been a failure to understand the program arises
from the sponsors' and administrators' inability to limit the program to a
special type compensation plan. Instead, this program has been viewed in
the geographic areas where mining is performed as the miners' pension
bill.
Id. at 73 (Minority Views) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 237,
286.
", Stephens & Hollon, supra note 76, at 794.
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health and safety laws and regulations relating to the industries
with which such diseases are associated.
1 50
More importantly, the 1977 Act prolonged the life of the
black lung benefits program. Because no state workers' compen-
sation law had been approved under Part C, "I' and because of
increased skepticism about the possibility that the 1969 Act's
coal dust standards would eradicate black lung disease among
coal miners, 5 2 Congress made the federal black lung benefits
program permanent.
5 3
The states' failure to enact workers' compensation statutes
meeting federal criteria prompted other Congressional action as
well. According to the Department of Labor, Title IV gave "little
fiscal incentive for the States to assume Black Lung responsibility
equal to Federal criteria."'15 4 Congress responded in 1977 by
easing the criteria state laws had to meet to be approved under
Part C.'1 The most important change provided that a state only
needed to provide benefits where the miner's last coal mine
employment terminated after the Secretary of Labor approved
the state law; coal mine operators could be liable for benefits
paid on account of any miner whose last coal mine employment
ended before the Secretary approved the state law.
5 6
The legislation did not have its desired impact. Kentucky
was the only state to subsequently explore certification to ad-
minister Part C, and no state applied for such certification. 5 7
2. Eligibility
The 1977 Act also followed the pattern set in 1972 by ex-
tending benefits to additional persons.' The 1977 Reform Act
1So 1977 Reform Act § 17(a), 29 U.S.C. 675 note (Supp. IV 1980).
- Randolph & Humphreys, supra note 28, at 556; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK
LUNG BENEFITS ACT: ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT DURING CAL-
ENDAR YEAR 1980 25 (1982) [hereinafter 1980 DOL REPORT].
M52 BARTH, supra note 28, at 46.
'51 1977 Reform Act § 7(d), 30 U.S.C. § 932(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
l5, DOL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
'" 1977 Reform Act § 6, 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
156 1977 Reform Act § 6(a), 30 U.S.C. § 932(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV. 1980).
' DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT: ANNUAL REPORT ON AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1982 19 (1983) [hereinafter 1982
DOL REPORT].
- By extending miners' benefits to additional persons, the measure also made
additional persons eligible for survivors' benefits.
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broadened the definition of "miner" to include coal mine con-
struction and transportation workers to the extent that they were
exposed to coal dust on the job. 15 9 In addition, the 1977 Reform
Act expanded the definition of the term "pneumoconiosis" by
including surface miners. As amended in 1972, Title IV defined
the term as "a chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of
employment in a coal mine."' 6 The 1977 Reform Act broadened
this definition to include "sequelae" of a chronic lung disease.'
6
1
Because the presence of statutorily-defined pneumoconiosis was
an essential element of a claim for benefits, a broader definition
of pneumoconiosis obviously meant broadened eligibility, and
therefore increased program costs.
3. Benefits
The 1977 Reform Act increased benefits for successful Part
B claimants by permitting them to recover medical benefits. 62
That is, the measure permitted "[A] miner (but not a miner's
family or survivors) receiving black lung benefits [to be] eligibile
for medical and rehabilitation benefits including treatment and/
or medications prescribed for the miner's black lung disease and
directly associated illnesses.' 1 63 Part C claimants were eligible
for such benefits under the 1972 Act;164 the 1977 Reform Act
extended similar benefits to successful Part B claimants.
Similarly, the 1977 Reform Act modified the Part B provi-
sions concerning reductions in black lung benefits to be more
like their Part C counterparts. The 1969 Act provided that Part
B benefits would be reduced by any amount received under state
workers' compensation laws on account of the miner's disability,
"9 1977 Reform Act § 2(a), 30 U.S.C. § 902(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
,60 1972 Act § 3(b), 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1976) (the 1969 Act defined pneumoconiosis
as a "chronic dust disease of the lung arising out of employment in an underground
coal mine." 1969 Act § 402(b)).
61 1977 Reform Act § 2(a), 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
161 1977 Reform Act § 11, 30 U.S.C. § 924(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
163 Background Information for Hearings, supra note 30, at 23.
I6 Id. at 6. Congress' reluctance to "just say no" to potential claimants carried
over to the Executive Branch; DOL three times extended the deadline for filing medical
benefits only claims. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF
THE ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1980 5 (1982) [hereinafter 1980 DOL REPORT].
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whereas Part C benefits were only reduced by any amount paid
under state or federal workers' compensation laws on account
of disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.165 The 1977 Reform
Act provided that Part B benefits would be reduced on account
of amounts paid under state workers' compensation laws only
if those amounts were paid because of disabilities arising out of
pneumoconiosis.166
The 1977 Reform Act was also intended to ensure that
successful claimants actually received the benefits to which they
were entitled. The measure clarified liability in certain situations
(such as corporate reorganizations and liquidations)67 in which
DOL had had difficulty determining liability. 168 The statute also
authorized the Secretary of Labor to create a Black Lung Com-
pensation Insurance Fund, if insurance was not otherwise avail-
able at reasonable cost, through which coal mine operators could
insure themselves against potential liability for black lung ben-
efits. 169
For substantially the same reason - ensuring that successful
claimants actually received their black lung benefits - the 1977
Revenue Act authorized coal mine operators to establish trust
accounts to ensure the payment of black lung benefits.170 Con-
tributions to such a trust were tax deductible, and the trust itself
was exempt from income tax.'
7'
4. Establishing Entitlement
One obvious reason for Congress' decision to revise Title
IV's benefit rules was a desire to eliminate differences in the
treatment of Part B and Part C claimants. 72 That motive also
16, See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
'1 1977 Reform Act § 4, 30 U.S.C. § 922(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
167 1977 Reform Act § 7(g), 30 U.S.C. § 932(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
'6 Lopatto, supra note 32, at 689.
16 1977 Reform Act § 13, 30 U.S.C. § 943 (Supp. IV 1980).
l70 1977 Revenue Act § 4, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(21) (Supp. IV 1980).
'7, 1977 Revenue Act § 4, 26 U.S.C. § 192(a) (Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of
the tax provisions of the 1977 Revenue Act, see Reese, The Section 4121 Coal Tax for
Financing Federal Black Lung Trust Fund Disability Payments, 32 OIL & GAs TAx Q.
341 (1983).
2 H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 238, 255.
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explains why Congress in 1977 changed some of the rules on
establishing entitlement. Part C contained a three-year statute
of limitations171 that had no counterpart in the Part B program.
This provision was considered one of the major reasons why the
Part C program's approval rate was so much lower than that of
Part B.' 74 The 1977 Reform Act revised the statute of limitations
by repealing it altogether as applied to survivors' claims, and by
extending the deadline for filing miners' claims to three years
from the later of (1) a medical determination of total disability
due to pneumoconiosis, or (2) March 1, 1978.17
Another motive for Congress' action in 1977 was a desire to
aid claimants. Congress pulled down evidentiary barriers that
had prevented many claimants from establishing entitlement un-
der the 1969 and 1972 legislation. The House of Representatives
was concerned about
the dilemma of survivors who, because of the absence of any
relevant medical evidence regarding the physical condition of
deceased miners, cannot establish the validity of any otherwise
valid claim. In most cases, the miner died many years ago,
and such evidence has been lost or destroyed by the miner's
physician, or is otherwise now non-existent.
176
The House version of the legislation, therefore, included a pro-
vision permitting the use of affidavits in a case lacking medical
or other evidence of a deceased miner's condition in order to
establish that the miner was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis
or that his death was due to pneumoconiosis. This provision was
included in the bill as enacted.
77
"1 1977 Reform Act § 7(e), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f) (1976). For a discussion of the
results of these provisions, see REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES BY
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, PROGRAM TO PAY BLACK LUNG
BENEFITS TO COAL MINERS AND THEmR SURVIVORS - IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED 47-49
(July 11, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL].
174 See, e.g., 1976 DOL REPORT, supra note 129, at 3; Lopatto, supra note 33, at
691.
6. 1977 Reform Act § 7(e), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f) (Supp. IV 1980).
176 H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 19-20, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 237, 255-56.
177 1977 Reform Act § 5(a), 30 U.S.C. § 923 (Supp. IV 1980). The difficult position
of the Executive Branch in implementing the black lung benefits program is indicated
by conflicting statements about the standard of proof utilized by SSA and DOL. Some
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The Senate also came to the aid of survivors who lacked
medical or other evidence of a deceased miner's condition. 78 As
enacted, the provision inserted by the Senate established a pre-
sumption that a survivor was eligible for benefits where a miner
who had at least twenty-five years of coal mine employment
before June 30, 1971, died on or before March 1, 1978. The
presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the miner was
not totally or partially disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time
of death.
179
Congress also pulled down administrative barriers that had
prevented claimants from establishing eligibility. DOL had a
practice of finding a miner ineligible, because not totally disa-
bled, if he was working in the mines at the time he filed a claim
for benefits or at the time of his death.8 0 Consistent with its
1972 resolution of the Part B dispute over the proper test of
disability,"8 ' Congress limited the circumstances in which mining
complained that DOL was too tough on claimants, see, e.g., Randolph & Humphreys,
supra note 28, at 555 ("the reluctance to provide benefits has taken many forms ....
[including] unwillingness of government agencies to accept at face value a widow's
affidavit or an X-ray interpretation by a coalfield doctor .. ") while others believed
SSA had been too lenient in granting benefits. See, e.g., LETTER FROM THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD 2 (February 16, 1973)
(finding that SSA awarded benefits based on "inconclusive" evidence); 1972 REPORT OF
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 95, at 49-51 (questioning 48 of 197 SSA decisions
the General Accounting Office reviewed, because the decisions lacked sufficient evidence
or the decisions were inconsistent with the evidence).
The General Accounting Office reviewed both the Part B and Part C programs
after the passage of the 1977 legislation. The Office concluded that Title IV, as amended,
permitted granting benefits without adequate evidence of disability. REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, LEGISLATION ALLOWS
BLACK LUNG BENEFITS TO BE AWARDED WITHOUT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF DISABILITY
(July 28, 1980) reprinted in Black Lung Benefits and Revenue Amendments of 1981,
Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources (1981), 12, 14 (concerning the Part B program); REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, LEGISLATION AUTHOR-
IZED BENEFITS WITHOUT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF BLACK LUNG OR DISABILITY (January
19, 1982) (concerning the Part C program).
" H. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 308, 311-12.
179 1977 Reform Act § 3(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
1w H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 237, 247; H. REP. No. 864, supra note 178, at 16-17, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 308, 310.
"I See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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employment would constitute a bar to an award of benefits. The
1977 legislation provided that (a) coal mine employment at the
time of a deceased miner's death would not constitute conclusive
evidence of the absence of a total disability, and (b) coal mine
employment at the time a living miner filed for benefits would
not be conclusive evidence of the absence of total disability if
circumstances indicated a reduced ability to perform his usual
coal mine work.1 1 2 The 1977 Reform Act also provided that a
miner could not receive benefits while employed in mining (but
he could receive black lung benefits if he terminated coal mine
employment within one year after the determination of eligibility
became final).183
Another administrative barrier was that DOL, like SSA be-
fore it, sent x-rays to experts for rereading.18 4 These consultants
frequently found that an x-ray did not show the presence of
pneumoconiosis, even though the miner's doctor had read the
x-ray as positive.' 85 In such a case, DOL generally relied on the
expert's interpretation and denied the claim. The 1977 Reform
Act restricted DOL's authority to have x-rays reviewed by ex-
perts; an x-ray reading submitted by a qualified radiologist, in
a case where there was other evidence of a pulmonary or respi-
ratory impairment, could not be reread at the government's
request (unless DOL suspected fraud) if the x-ray was of suffi-
cient quality to demonstrate the presence of pneumoconiosis and
was taken by a qualified radiologist or technician.8 6
Aiding claimants, of course, was an important policy consid-
eration in 1969 and 1972, but the 1977 Reform Act took the
policy to new heights. Congress was displeased that potential
,8 1977 Reform Act § 2(c), 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
83 1977 Reform Act § 5(d), 30 U.S.C. § 923(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
's H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 237, 256.
85 Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 237, 256-57.
,86 1977 Reform Act § 5(a), 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (Supp. IV 1980). The General
Accounting Office in 1977 recommended that DOL reread negative x-rays and use
positive rereadings as evidence supporting a claim. 1977 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, supra note 173, at 52. DOL adopted this proposal and, in fact, continued to
reread negative x-rays after the 1977 Reform Act restricted its authority to reread positive
x-rays. LETTER OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
TO SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER 7 (September 15, 1980) (concerning DOL's actions
in response to the 1977 Report of the Comptroller General).
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claimants were not aware of the existence of the black lung
benefits program until after the Part B program had expired.'
7
To prevent further ignorance of the program among potential
claimants, the 1977 Reform Act required the Secretaries of Labor
and HEW to "undertake, through appropriate organizations,
groups, and coal mine operators, to notify individuals who are
likely to have become eligible for benefits by reason of [the 1977
legislative] changes.'
188
In addition, the 1977 Reform Act effectively made the
changed rules on establishing entitlement retroactive because all
previously denied or pending claims were to be reconsidered
under the new rules. 189 The process for reconsidering Part C
claims was simple: DOL was to automatically review all denied
and pending Part C claims, taking into consideration the pro-
visions of the 1977 Reform Act.' 9°
The process for reconsidering Part B claims was much more
complicated. SSA was to notify each Part B claimant whose
claim had been denied or was pending that he could have the
claim reviewed by either SSA or DOL. l9y If he chose to have the
claim reviewed directly by DOL, the claimant could submit
additional evidence and the claim would be considered, taking
into account the provisions of the 1977 Reform Act. 192 If the
claimant chose to have the claim reviewed by SSA, that agency
would review the claim using the evidence on file, but taking
into consideration the provisions of the 1977 Reform Act.' 93 If
SSA found the claimant ineligible, the claim would automatically
be referred to DOL, 194 which would permit the claimant to
"' H. REP. No. 151, supra note 6, at 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 237, 249.
38 1977 Reform Act § 19, 30 U.S.C. § 904 (Supp, IV 1980).
"' 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945 (Supp. IV 1980).
'9 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Approximately
125,000 Part C claims were reviewed under the 1977 Reform Act. 1979 DOL REPORT
supra note 49, at 9.
'9, 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
'g 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
'91 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
1" 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). DOL
reviewed approximately 118,000 SSA Part B claims under the 1977 Reform Act. 1979
DOL REPORT supra note 49, at 4.
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introduce new evidence and determine eligibility based on the
provisions of the 1977 Reform Act.' 95
The potential cost of reconsidering all Title IV claims was
staggering because of the age of the claims concerned. For
example, a Part B claim submitted in 1970 could have been
reviewed and denied under the 1969 Act, reviewed and denied
under the 1972 Act, reviewed and denied by SSA under the 1977
Reform Act, and then reviewed and approved by DOL under
the 1977 Reform Act. Because black lung benefits were generally
paid from the date the claimant applied for benefits,'9 such a
claimant would be due a sizable sum in back benefits.
To keep costs under control, the 1977 Reform Act revised
the payment rules. If a claimant elected review by DOL or SSA,
and his claim was ultimately approved by DOL, the claimant
could receive benefits starting from the date he filed an election
of review. 97 A Part B claim approved by SSA under the new
rules or a Part C claim approved by DOL under the new rules
would be governed by the old Title IV payment rules.
C. Consequences
The impact of the 1977 Reform Act was considerable and
immediate:
The SSA allowed an additional 23,178 claims, bringing the
final tally for Part B claims under the 1969, 1972, and 1978
legislation to an 81 percent approval rate. On July 28, 1980,
the Government Accounting Office reported to Congress that
its random study of SSA approvals indicated that 88.5 percent
were not based on adequate medical evidence establishing total
disability or death from black lung....
The DOL figure shot up to 60,028 by 1980, and by the end
of 1981, the total was 89,400 approved claims. In addition,
nearly 111,000 medical benefit only (MBO) claims were ap-
proved for Trust Fund payment by DOL. 98
,' 1977 Reform Act § 15, 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(3), (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
' See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
,97 1977 Reform Act § 15, 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
"I Lopatto, supra note 32, at 693 (footnotes omitted).
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Between January 1, 1978 and June 30, 1979, the DOL ap-
proval rate for initial findings was fifty-five percent,'9 up from
less than ten percent prior to the 1977 legislation. By 1981,
however, the approval rate had decreased substantially, "because
'permanent' Part C regulations ... were more restrictive and
required better quality medical evidence than had the DOL ver-
sion of the interim presumption .... ,,200 Considering the previ-
ous history of the black lung benefits program, one might have
expected Congressional action to increase the approval rate.
Persons holding such an expectation got a rude awakening in
1981.
IV. BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVENUE ACT OF 1981
The 1981 black lung legislation was unlike any of its prede-
cessors. Despite the low approval rate for claims under Part C,
Congress decided that the program should be restricted instead
of expanded. The primary reason for Congress' changed course
was the condition of the Trust Fund. In just four years, the
Trust Fund had accumulated a deficit of $1.5 billion, 20' a figure
that was projected to double in another four years.
20 2
The huge deficit amassed in such a short time probably
helped the Labor Department in building a coalition of labor,
industry, and insurance carriers to support the reform legislation
it drafted. 203 Coalition-building was no doubt assisted by the
I" DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT: ANNUAL REPORT ON AD-
MINISTRATION OF THE ACT DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1978 AND JANUARY 1 - JUNE 30,
1979, 5 (1979) [hereinafter 1978-79 DOL REPORT].
m Lopatto, supra note 32, at 694-95.
1' H. REP. No. 406, supra note 143, at 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmm. NEWS 2671, 2673. The Trust Fund had run a deficit every year since its inception,
increasing continuously from a deficit of $19 million in fiscal 1978 to a deficit of $552
million in fiscal 1981. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE AND JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IsT SEss., EXPLANATION OF S. 1957 (BLACK LUNG BENEFITS
REVENUE ACT OF 1981) 4 (Comm. Print 1981). [hereinafter 1981 SENATE FINANCE
COMMITrTEE REPORT]."
202 Black Lung Benefits and Revenue Amendments of 1981, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1 (1981).
203 Lopatto, supra note 32, at 677. Another factor aiding the Department's coalition-
building efforts was the extent of dissatisfaction with the 1977 legislation. Coal mine
operators were so displeased with the implementation of the 1977 legislation that they
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provision allowing Congressmen to deduct certain expenses in-
curred in maintaining a second home.2°4 The strategy proposed
by DOL and adopted by Congress was to use a two-pronged
attack, increasing taxes and reducing outlays, to conquer the
deficit.205
A. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981
Title I of the 1981 Amendments, the "Black Lung Benefits
Revenue Act of 1981" (1981 Revenue Act)2°6 imposed a tempo-
rary tax increase to generate greater revenues. The tax on un-
derground coal was raised from fifty cents to one dollar per
ton, the tax on surface-mined coal was increased from twenty-
five to fifty cents per ton, and the tax was capped at four
percent of the coal's selling price rather than two percent. 20 7 The
tax increase applied to sales of coal after December 31, 1981,208
and would terminate at the earlier of (a) January 1, 1996, or (b)
when the Trust Fund had fully repaid all advances from the




The tax increase was obviously intended to improve the
solvency of the Trust Fund. Title I was also designed to meet
other important policy goals, such as attempting to ensure that
the Trust Fund would not again develop a large deficit. 210 The
measure specified that the Trust Fund was to be used to pay
amounts under Title IV "as in effect immediately after" the
passage of the 1981 Amendments.
21'
filed a suit charging the Department of Labor with wasting Trust Fund assets by
improperly granting benefits. National Coal Association v. Marshall, 510 F. Supp. 803
(D.D.C. 1981). The case was dismissed as nonjusticiable. Id. at 807.
1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC.
According to one commentator, increasing taxes and tightening eligibility rules
for future claims was considered less politically inflammatory than other suggestions
(such as taking approved beneficiaries off the rolls by a refiling or review amendment).
Lopatto, supra note 33, at 695.
Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 [hereinafter 1981 Revenue Act].
1981 Revenue Act § 102(a), 26 U.S.C. § 1421(e) (1982).
Wo 1981 Revenue Act § 102(b), 26 U.S.C. § 1421 note (1982).
1981 Revenue Act § 102(a), 26 U.S.C. § 4121(e)(2) (1982).
2,1 H. REP. No. 406, supra note 143, at 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2671, 2763.
'" 1981 Revenue Act § 103(a), 26 U.S.C. § 9501(d)(7) (1982).
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This provision requires that the expenditure purposes of the
fund be conformed to reflect substantive changes relating to
eligibility and benefits that may be made by other appropriate
committees in the future, before the fund will make payment
for any such amended purpose. This provision is to ensure
that the fund will have sufficient revenue to satisfy obligations
arising from amendments made after enactment of this bill.
2 12
Another important policy goal of Title I was fairness. Some
legislators believed that operators and their insurance companies
were unfairly liable for benefits under the 1977 Reform Act in
cases where a claimant originally had been ineligible but became
entitled to benefits under liberalized standards applied retroac-
tively. 2 3 To address these concerns, Congress included a provi-
sion under which
certain claims which had been assigned to individual coal op-
erators [were] transferred to the Black Lung Disability Trust
Fund. In general, these are claims which had been denied prior
to March 1, 1978, but which had been reviewed and approved
under the liberalized eligibility criteria and evidentiary stan-
dards of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 .... 114
The result of this provision was that the Trust Fund became
liable for benefits in an additional 10,200 cases. 215 This liability
was projected to exceed the savings from the benefit changes in
Title 11216 over the next five years.
217
B. Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981
. Title II of the 1981 Amendments, "Benefits Amendments,"
(1981 Benefits Amendments) 28 attempted to reduce outlays by
tightening eligibility and even eliminating entitlement in certain
Z H. REP. No. 406, supra note 143, at 6, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMnN. NEWS 2671, 2675.
2M3 Id. at 9, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2671, 2677
(summarizing the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Oversight).
Id. at 5, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2671, 2674.
Id. at 10, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI. NEws 2671, 2678 (letter
from the Congressional Budget Office).
216 Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 [hereinafter 1981 Benefits Amendments].
27 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 114, 115.
2,8 Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 (1981).
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cases. Unlike most of the changes enacted in 1972 and 1977, the
new eligibility rules were generally prospective; they applied to
claims filed after January 1, 1982.219 Claimants who feared that
they might be ineligible under the new standards had to file
before that date to have their claims considered under the 1977
rules.
1. Program Administration
The 1981 Amendments, like the earlier black lung statutes,
required the Executive Branch to carry out research. DOL was
to consult with the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)220 in completing "a study of current medical methods for
the diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, and of the nature and extent
of impairment and disability that are attributable to the existence
of both simple and complicated pneumoconiosis." 22' DOL was
also to study "the benefits provided by the Black Lung Benefits
Act, other benefits received by individuals who receive benefits
under that Act, and benefits which would be received were State




Congress in 1981 retreated from the position it took in 1972
concerning survivors' eligibility. The 1972 Act extended eligibility
to survivors of a miner who was totally disabled by pneumoco-
niosis at the time of his death. 223 The 1981 Amendments provided
that such survivors would no longer be eligible for benefits.
224
3. Benefits
The 1981 Amendments modified Title IV's provision estab-
lishing benefit rates. Under the 1969 Act, a successful claimant
219 1981 Benefits Amendments § 206(a), 30 U.S.C. § 901 note (1982).
Formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare [hereinafter HHS].
"1 1981 Benefits Amendments § 202(e), 30 U.S.C. § 901 note (1982).
22 1981 Benefits Amendments § 203(c), 30 U.S.C. § 901 note (1982).
21, See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
1" 1981 Benefits Amendments § 203(a)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1982).
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with no dependents received fifty percent of the minimum
monthly payment for a disabled federal employee in grade GS-
2.225 The 1981 Amendments provided that successful claimants
would receive benefits equal to 37 1/2 percent of the monthly
rate for Federal employees in grade GS-2, step 1.226 This change
did not reduce the amount of benefits actually paid to a suc-
cessful claimant; the monthly benefit rate for a recipient with
no dependents went from $279.80 in fiscal year 1981 to $293.20
in fiscal year 1982. 
2 7
Congress in 1981 did provide for a decrease in program
outlays - but probably did so out of a concern for increasing
fairness more than out of a concern for lowering costs. The
1969 Act provided that benefits for Part B claims were to be
reduced by the amount of excess earnings under the Social
Security Act, 221 but Part C contained no such language. The
1981 Amendments required that benefits for successful Part C
claimants be reduced by the amount that benefits would be
reduced under the Social Security Act on account of excess
earnings .229
In addition to addressing concerns about the amount of
money successful claimants received, Congress addressed con-
cerns about the length of time that passed before successful
claimants received their money. The program had developed
lengthy delays in claims processing, 210 partly because coal mine
operators contested an unexpectedly large number of claims.
231
Congress was concerned that the interest rate on unpaid benefits
was so low as to provide an incentive for operators to contest
claims and thereby delay paying bdnefits.22 The 1981 Amend-
ments increased the interest rate from six percent233 to fifteen
"' See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
22 1981 Benefits Amendments § 203(d), 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1982).
12 1982 DOL REPORT, supra note 157, at 28 (Table 5).
228 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
19 1981 Benefits Amendments § 203(b), 30 U.S.C. § 932(g) (1982).
230 See LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFCE, supra note 186, at 2-3.
231 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
232 H. REP. No. 406, supra note 143, at 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2671, 2673.
233 1981 SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 201, at 3, 6.
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percent during calendar year 1982 and, in subsequent years, to
the rate set in Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code.
234
4. Establishing Entitlement
In 1981, Congress reconsidered some of its earlier decisions
on establishing entitlement. Title IV, prior to 1981, contained
several presumptions to aid claimants and to help process claims
expeditiously. The 1981 Amendments backed away from this
approach, instead requiring claimants to produce evidence estab-
lishing entitlement. Two presumptions were repealed with respect
to claims filed after the effective date of the 1981 legislation
(January 1, 1982): (a) the 1969 Act's rebuttable presumption of
death due to pneumoconiosis where a miner with at least ten
years of coal mine employment died from a respirable disease,
235
and (b) the 1972 Act's rebuttable presumption of total disability
due to pneumoconiosis, death due to pneumoconiosis, or total
disability due to pneumoconiosis where a miner had at least
fifteen years of underground coal mine employment and a totally
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment. 2 6 The 1981
Amendments also repealed a presumption enacted in 1977, but
this repeal was not effective until 180 days after the effective
date of the 1981 legislation. 237 This particular repealed language
provided a rebuttable presumption that a deceased miner's sur-
vivors were eligible for benefits where a miner who died on or
before March 1, 1978, had at least twenty-five years of coal
mine employment before June 30, 1971 .238
Congress also reconsidered its 1977 decision permitting sur-
vivors to establish entitlement by affidavit evidence. 2 9 Appar-
ently apprehensive over the possibility that benefits could be
granted on the basis of self-serving statements by a claimant,
31 1981 Benefits Amendments § 104(a), 30 U.S.C. § 934(b)(5) (1982). The 1981
Amendments also increased the interest rate the Trust Fund paid on advances "to reflect
more accurately the anticipated term of the advance." H. REp. No. 406, supra note
143, at 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADbnN. NEws 2671, 2673.
233 1981 Benefits Amendments § 202(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (1982).
236 1981 Benefits Amendments § 202(b)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (1982).
117 1981 Benefits Amendments § 202(b)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(5) (1982).
238 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
219 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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Congress provided that an affidavit could only be considered if




After the 1981 Amendments took effect, the Part C claims
approval rate tumbled; during 1982, 4,638 initial decisions were
rendered under DOL's "permanent" regulations241 with an ap-
proval rate of about three percent. 242 Low approval rates contin-
ued in subsequent years. 243 Not surprisingly, the 1981
Amendments were not well received in the coal mining regions.3
V. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1981
Congress has not enacted any significant revision in the black
lung program's authorizing legislation since 1981. Congress,
however, has taken action in response to what one representative
termed a "deplorable" situation. 2A5 The black lung benefits pro-
gram was plagued by large backlogs at the hearing and appellate
levels during the early and mid 1980s. Indeed, a General Ac-
counting Office report concluded that, using fiscal 1984 staffing
levels and procedures, DOL's Office of Administrative Law
Judges would need more than thirty-five years to reduce the
backlog to a level the Chief Administrative Law Judge consid-
ered reasonable.24 Large backlogs meant long delays in case
1981 Benefits Amendments § 202(c), 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1982).
'' Standards for Determining Coal Miners' Total Disability or Death Due To
Pneumoconiosis, 20 C.F.R. § 718 (1980).
142 1982 DOL REPORT supra note 157, at I.
2, See, e.g., 1985 DOL REPORT supra note 8, at 3 (the "overall approval rate in
1985 was five (5) percent").
, See generally, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, supra note 69; Hearings before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, supra note 78 (containing extensive testimony
from miners, claimants' attorneys, and United Mine Workers officials expressing dissat-
isfaction with the 1981 Amendments).
' Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, supra note 69, at 1 (statement of Congressman Austin Murphy
commenting on the massive backlog of cases).
Z,, 1984 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 78, at 3. The report
also indicated that, using fiscal 1984 staffing levels and procedures, the Benefits Review
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processing, 247 which was particularly undesirable because many
claimants died before their claims were resolved.
241
To reduce the backlog, Congress passed appropriations meas-
ures granting DOL additional resources to process claims 249 and
encouraged the development of new procedures to combat de-
lay. 2 0 In addition, when Congress enacted significant revisions
in the Longshoremen's Act, the Benefits Review Board was
expanded from three to nine members and was authorized to
act through panels of three board members.
25'
Board would take approximately six years to reduce its black lung backlog to levels
considered reasonable. Id. at 4.
Many factors combined to cause the large backlog of black lung claims. One
important factor was the history of the program's authorizing legislation. When the
program was created in 1969, Congress recognized that there would be a backlog of
claims. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Some of these claims were processed
to completion by awarding benefits under the 1969 Act. Others, particularly denied
claims, were beginning to trickle through to the advanced stages of the processing
system. Lopatto, supra note 32, at 687. As a result of the 1972 Act's mandate that
denied or pending claims be reconsidered under the new standards, many cases were
sent back to the early stages of the case processing system. HEW, TmRD ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 32, 13. The scenario was repeated in 1977.
By diverting pending or denied claims back into the case processing system, to be
merged with the stream of new filings, the 1972 and 1977 legislation effectively dammed
up the claims processing system at the early stages. The 1981 legislation did not require
the reconsideration of pending or denied claims. As a result, cases poured through to
the advanced stages of the claims processing system, which could not handle the flood.
' "By 1984, the backlog of black lung claims increased to the point where it was
not unusual for an individual to wait up to 7 years or longer for a final decision, if he
appealed his claim through the Benefits Review Board." DEt.AYS IN PRocEssiNo HEARING,
supra note 78, at 112 (statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd).
M INVESTIGATION OF THE BACKLOG HEARINGS, supra note 69, at 2 (statement of
Congressman Austin Murphy).
1, For example, Congress in a 1985 supplemental appropriations bill authorized
DOL to borrow underworked administrative law judges from other agencies. Id. at 146
(statement of Congressman Paul Konjorski). Congress also adopted Senator Byrd's
proposal to give DOL an extra $1.5 million in fiscal 1986 to hire eight additional
administrative law judges and support personnel. 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 198.
250 One innovative case-processing technique was known as the contract writer
program, in which the functions of a law clerk were performed by an independent
contractor rather than a DOL employee. As described by Chief Administrative Law
Judge Nahum Litt, "we have a law clerk program where we have ex-law clerks from
our own office principally and retired judges who have experience in trying and writing
cases, working for us as law clerks." Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, supra note 69, at 126.
"I Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 15, 98 Stat. 1639, 1649-50 (1984).
JOURNAl, OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
Congress has also taken action in response to concerns about
the continuing solvency of the Trust Fund. The fiscal 1986
budget increased the tax rate for sales of coal after March 31,
1986252 to $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal and 55 cents
per ton of surface-mined coal, with the tax capped at 4.4 percent
of the coal's sale price. 253 That measure also specified that after
the temporary tax increase terminated, the tax rate would be
reduced to its 1977 level of fifty cents per ton on underground-
mined coal and twenty-five cents per ton on surface-mined coal,
with the tax cap reduced to two percent of the coal's sale price.
254
The fiscal 1987 budget extended the temporary tax increase until
January 1, 2014, unless the Trust Fund had repaid all advances
and all interest on such advances before that date.
255
In addition, Congress reduced Trust Fund outlays - but not
in a way that affected benefit payments. The 1986 budget pro-
vided that no interest would accrue on repayable advances from
the Treasury to the Trust Fund during the period from October
1, 1985 to September 30, 1990.256 In other words, Congress
decided that a solvent, self-supporting Trust Fund was more
important than a complete payback of all amounts paid from
the general fund.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the legislative history of the federal
black lung benefits program in order to determine why the
program cost so much more than originally anticipated. The
easy answer is that the program changed so much over the years
because Congress expanded eligibility for benefits, eased the
rules for establishing entitlement, and transformed a temporary
program into a permanent one.
212 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act for Fiscal Year 1986 [herein-
after 1986 Budget Act], Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 13203(d), 100 Stat. 82, 312 (Supp. IV
1986).
"1 1986 Budget Act § 13203(a), 26 U.S.C. § 4121(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1986).
252 1986 Budget Act § 13203(a), 26 U.S.C. § 4121(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
'" Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act for Fiscal Year 1987 [herein-
after 1987 Budget Act], Pub. L. No. 100-203, Title X, Section 10503, 101 Stat. 1330,
1330-446.
1 1986 Budget Act § 13203(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9501 note (West 1988).
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The easy answer, however, raises a difficult question: Why
did Congress change the program so much in such a short time?
A variety of factors affected the evolution of Title IV. One
factor was problems in the drafting of the 1969 Act. Congress
certainly did not intend to prevent "double orphans" from
receiving benefits and probably did not intend to create inequities
in the treatment of Part B and federal Part C recipients. Another
factor can be described as unfulfilled expectations. The states
were expected to revise their workers' compensation statutes to
meet federal criteria; when they failed to do so, Congress re-
sponded by making significant revisions in Title IV. Another
factor was a change in Congress' perception of important facts
surrounding the program. In 1969 Congress underestimated the
extent of the black lung problem; subsequently, it significantly
expanded the program. And, of course, one factor was good
old-fashioned policy-making. For example, Congress made a
policy decision to permit dependent parents of a deceased miner,
as well as other persons not themselves suffering from pneu-
moconiosis, to receive black lung benefits.
From a substantive standpoint, then, the changes in the
federal black lung benefits program (and, by implication, its
surprisingly high cost) was caused by a complex combination of
factors. From a procedural perspective, however, those changes
can be explained much more simply: Congress closely monitored
the program and responded to problems, developments, and
changes as the program was implemented. The black lung ben-
efits program was clearly not an example of a program run
amuck due to a lack of Congressional oversight and attention.
Congress kept an eye on the program and repeatedly adjusted it
to fit the circumstances as Congress understood them. In short,
Congress learned from experience.

